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Abstract
Various empirical papers have shown that peers affect productivity and behavior in the
workplace. However, the mechanisms through which peers influence each other are still largely
unknown. In this laboratory experiment we study a situation in which individuals might look at
their peers’ behavior to motivate themselves to endure in a task that requires perseverance. We
test the impact of unidirectional peer effects under individual monetary incentives, controlling for
ability and tactics. We find that peers significantly increase their observers’ perseverance, while
knowing about being observed does not significantly affect behavior. In a second experiment
we investigate the motives to self-select into the role of an observing or an observant subject
and what kind of peers individuals deliberately choose. Our findings provide first insights on
the perception of peer situations by individuals and new empirical evidence on how peer groups
emerge.
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1 Introduction
Peers affect productivity and behavior in the workplace. Both theoretical papers (for instance
Kandel & Lazear (1992)) as well as several empirical studies (such as the papers by Falk & Ichino
(2006), Mas & Moretti (2009), Bandiera et al. (2010) and Baeker & Mechtel (2013)) show that
individuals are influenced by others working besides them. However, the exact channels through
which individuals influence each other are still largely unexplored (Charness & Kuhn 2011). Peer
effects could, for example, stem from imitation of behavior (Bandura & Walters 1963, Mobius &
Rosenblat 2014), an increase in knowledge about the task (Banerjee 1992, Guryan et al. 2009),
competitive preferences (O’Keeffe et al. 1984), guilt and shame (Kandel & Lazear 1992), a desire
for conformity (Bernheim 1994, Bellemare et al. 2010), self-perception in comparison to others
(Deci & Ryan 1985) or the pure joy of working with others (Bandiera et al. 2010).
In this paper we apply a novel experimental design to study one isolated channel of peer effects:
We analyze if and how peers affect each others’ perseverance on a task. By focusing on perseverance,
our paper also contributes to the emerging economic literature on non-cognitive skills. Recent
studies in the fields of psychology and economics have shown that perseverance over a longer
period of time – an attribute also known as grit – is an important determinant for various life
outcomes. It has been shown that grit elicited from questionnaires is a reliable predictor for pupils’
success in the national spelling bee, retention rates of West Point Military Academy cadets and
Grade Point Averages (GPA) among Ivy League undergraduates (Duckworth et al. 2007, Eskreis-
Winkler et al. 2014). Gerhards & Gravert (2015) introduce the first experimental measure of grit in
a short-term laboratory real effort task and show that more gritty behavior leads to higher earnings
in the experiment irrespective of subjects’ initial ability. In the present paper we extend this work
and combine the elicitation of grit with a peer setting in order to study how gritty behavior is
influenced by the information about a peer’s perseverance. This is an important question since up
to date there has been no consensus on whether perseverance in the face of challenges is an inherent
trait or a malleable attribute that can be learned (Alan et al. 2015). If it is an inherent trait then
we should not find any peer effects in perseverance. If however, it is something that can be learned
or at least stimulated by a peer, then we should see a difference in perseverance between an isolated
and a peer situation.
We base our research design on the following idea: While workers might not know their co-
workers’ initial abilities and cannot assess the quality of the output before the termination of a
project, they often have a good estimate of how much effort their colleagues exert and how long
they remain working on the task at hand. Consider for instance graduate students working in the
same office: They can observe on a daily basis when their peers come and go and whether they
are working on their research projects or browsing the internet. But different fields of research and
methods might make it difficult to compare the peers’ progresses and outputs to their own. Nev-
ertheless, observing the other students working longer and more diligently likely affects a student’s
perseverance on his or her own project.
There exists a wide range of other situations, for instance in sports, social and educational
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contexts, in which perseverance plays an important role and diligent comrades, moreover, affect
their peers. From a research perspective, however, these field settings might be confounded by
several factors that cannot be controlled for. Examples are (self-)selection based on homophilistic
preferences (which can cause spurious correlations (Manski 1993)), “reflection problems” of peers
simultaneously influencing each other or complementarities between individuals in case their work
tasks or payoffs are interrelated. We therefore decided to conduct a controlled laboratory exper-
iment that excludes these and other confounding factors. Our subjects are randomly assigned to
treatments and work on a word play task in which they solve anagrams on an individual piece rate
basis. As a way to avoid working hard, subjects can choose to solve easier anagrams or to skip
individual hard anagrams. Both avoidance behaviors come at an explicit cost. We compare the
subjects’ performance and amount of avoidance behavior when working by themselves (“Baseline
Treatment”) to a peer situation (“Random Matching Treatment”) where half of the subjects are
randomly assigned the role of what we call an “Observer” who is informed about his or her ran-
domly matched “Peer’s” avoidance behavior. The Peers know that they are observed by another
subject, but do not receive any further information about their Observer.
We find, first, that Observers (compared to subjects from the Baseline Treatment) significantly
reduce their avoidance behavior if they are presented with information about their Peers’ respective
behavior. Peers’ and Baseline Treatment subjects’ avoidance behavior, on the other hand, does
not differ significantly. Second, personal attributes such as ability and self-reported grit play less
of a role in explaining the avoidance behavior of subjects from the Random Matching Treatment
than in the Baseline Treatment. And third, the Observers’ inclination to switch to easy anagrams
is significantly positively correlated with their Peer’s switching behavior. Interestingly, this effect
is even stronger if the Peer is of similar or worse ability.
Taken as a whole, we conclude that staying perseverant on a task does not only depend on
individuals’ own grittiness, but hinges on the peer group composition at hand. In the conclusion
we provide a range of domains in which we expect these peer effects in perseverance to affect
peoples’ performance and discuss resulting policy implications
Related literature: A handful of other papers have looked at peer effects and performance
in laboratory settings. The first three papers that we will briefly describe below consider peer
effects in subjects’ performance and output in general. The forth paper focuses on peer effects in
perseverance in particular.1
Georganas et al. (2015) randomly ask their subjects to work on Gill & Prowse’s (2012) slider
task and assign them into three groups. Subjects in the first group are observed by another
subject, those from the second group observe another subject and subjects in the third group work
1Furthermore, a number of field experiments study the effect of related personal attributes such as self-control on
real-life outcomes (see for instance Buechel et al. (2014) who link self-control to academic success and Kaur et al.
(2010) who link it to success at work). Also, a number of laboratory experiments investigate the determinants of
shirking in real-effort tasks (see for instance Corgnet et al. (2015) on diligence in summing up numbers or Bucciol
et al. (2013) on the ability to withstand temptation in a counting task) and the effects of being observed by group
members (see for example Charness et al. (2007) and Andreoni & Bernheim (2009)).
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in isolation. The authors find no overall peer effects on performance in the first two groups when
subjects work under individual piece rate incentives. They conjecture that this could be explained
by a significant and dominant learning effect that conceals potential treatment effects.2 Beugnot
et al. (2013) test whether the strength of peer effects depends on the actual presence of a peer. In
one of their treatments subjects are informed about a peer’s outcome who has worked on the same
real effort task (a math task) in an earlier session. In a second treatment subjects are continuously
informed about the performance of a peer who is simultaneously working in the same room. In both
treatments the authors find significant peer effects for men, but not for women. They conclude
that the observed effects are likely driven by rivalry between peers, which they find to be stronger
for men than for women. Van Veldhuizen et al. (2015) set out to replicate the main features and
findings of Mas & Moretti’s (2009) seminal field study in the lab. Groups of four students work
in a team to solve a predetermined number of mathematical calculations. By design, the subjects’
payoffs do not depend on the other participants, but their workload does. Depending on their role in
the team, subjects can either observe others, are observed by others, do both things simultaneously
or cannot do either. In contrast to Mas & Moretti (2009), the authors find no difference between
being observed and observing a coworker. They do, however, discover heterogeneous peer effects in
productivity. When subjects are aware of the general productivity level of their peer, some subjects
reciprocate a fast co-worker, while others free-ride on the faster co-worker’s effort.
Lastly, similar to our study, Bonein & Denant-Bomont (2015) study individuals’ perseverance
– more precisely their self-control – in the presence of a peer. In their experiment subjects work
on the slider task and can commit themselves to an output level ex ante. The authors find that
subjects choose higher penalties for not reaching their goal if they know that their output will
be reported to another participant with whom they interact in a later stage of the experiment.
However, they do not find any effects on increased perseverance on the actual task. Besides the
apparent differences between their and our experimental setups, it should moreover be noted that
Bonein & Denant-Bomont (2015) measure perseverance as a zero/one decision. Once a subject
decides to give in to temptation he or she could not return to the experiment. In a sense, their
perseverance measure is hence more strict than our measures of giving up in the form of skipping
or switching to easy anagrams, which can happen multiple times during an experimental session.
Furthermore, compared to the studies by Georganas et al. (2015), Beugnot et al. (2013) and van
Veldhuizen et al. (2015), our design allows to analyze peer effects in perseverance in isolation,
keeping biasing learning effects, competitive motives and interdependecies between subjects at a
minimum. First, we restrict our analysis of treatment effects to the final part of the experimental
sessions when further learning can largely be ruled out. Second, we inform Observers only about
their Peers’ avoidance behavior and not about their performance or output. And third, we consider
performance in individual tasks only.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a simple model of peer
2In a team incentive treatment they find that observed participants increase their productivity a bit faster than
the control group. However, this group catches up to them within 3 minutes of the experiment. Possibly, being
observed leads to slightly faster learning in this experiment.
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effects in perseverance. In section 3 we turn to the description of our experimental design. We
then discuss the results from our Baseline and Random Matching Treatment. In the last part of
the paper, we widen our focus to the conscious decision of selecting peers. First, we analyze which
personal characteristics predict a preference for being observed (i.e. self-selection into the Peer’s
role) rather than observing someone else (i.e. self-selection into the Observer’s role). Second, we
investigate which type of Peer Observers choose to observe given information about his previous
performance. We provide a detailed description of the experimental design and a discussion of our
findings from this additional “Chosen Matching Treatment” in section 4. The paper concludes in
section 5.
2 Conceptual framework
We use the following simple 2-person model that is based on Ichino & Maggi (2000) to illustrate how
peers can affect each others’ perseverance on our experimental work task. Consider person i who
chooses a level of perseverance Pi > 0 in order to maximize his utility Ui = G(Pi, θi) − C(Pi, Pj).
The first term of the utility function captures person i’s gain from staying perseverant on hard
anagrams. It depends both on Pi and θi. As we will discuss in detail below, in our experiment we
will measure Pi indirectly as i’s decision not to skip individual hard anagrams and not to switch
to easy anagrams. The individual preference parameter θi could for instance reflect task ability or
grit. We assume the gain term to be concave in perseverance (∂G/∂Pi > 0 and ∂
2G/∂P 2i < 0)
and that higher values of θi indicate a person with a higher marginal gain from perseverance Pi
(∂2G/∂Pi∂θi > 0). The possibility of peer effects is introduced with the second term. Person i
incurs costs that depend both on his own perseverance Pi and on his peer’s perseverance Pj . If
∂2C/∂Pi∂Pj ≤ 0, i’s costs of perseverance decreases in the peer’s perseverance Pj . That is, it may
be costly for person i not to keep up with person j’s perseverance. In the absence of peer effects,
on the contrary, we have ∂2C/∂Pi∂Pj = 0.
Each person chooses Pi to maximize his individual utility Ui. Assuming, for simplicity, a linear
relationship, we can express the optimal level of perseverance as Pi = θi +βPj where the weighting
factor β measures the strength of peer effects. Positive peer effects are reflected in β > 0, β < 0
represent negative peer effects and β = 0 implies absence of peer effects.
As we will describe in detail below, in our experiment only Observers from the Random Match-
ing Treatment are informed about another person’s perseverance. Therefore only the Observers’
perseverance will be a function of θi and Pj as described above and given by P
O
i = θi + βθj . On
the contrary, Peers from the Random Matching Treatment as well as subjects from the Baseline
Treatment will choose their optimal level of perseverance only based on their individual preferences:
P Ii = θi. Obviously, P
O
i > P
I
i for β > 0. That is, if positive peer effects exists, Observers should
stay more perseverant on the experimental task than Peers and subjects in the Baseline Treatment.
Furthermore, it should be noted that in the above model POi does not depend on the Peer’s
level of perseverance Pj . That is, the mere presence of the Peer should improve the Observer’s
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perseverance compared to that of subjects from the Baseline Treatment. The socio-psychological
literature discusses this effect as the so-called social facilitation paradigm (Zajonc 1965).
3 Peer effects
3.1 Experimental design
During the experimental sessions subjects work on an anagram word play task in which they have
to rearrange the letters of English words to form new ones. As an example consider the word “top”
that can be rearranged to “pot” and “opt”. We accept all possible anagrams that can be build
from a word as a correct solution and offer two levels of difficulty. “Easy anagrams” consist of
3 to 4 letters, “hard anagrams” comprise 5 to 7 letters.3 As discussed in detail in Gerhards &
Gravert (2015) the anagram task is perceived as rather challenging and does not favor any of the
sexes in the sense that men’s and women’s performance does not differ significantly.4 Irrespective
of treatment, all subjects are presented with the same anagrams in the same order.
The experiment starts with a five minute practice round in which subjects are only asked to
solve easy anagrams. Performance in this part is not monetarily incentivized. It allows subjects to
familiarize themselves with the experimental task.
In the main part of the experiment subjects are paid according to their performance and are
free to choose between solving hard and easy anagrams. We consider working on hard anagrams
as the main task, working on easy anagrams serves as an outside option. This is reflected in
both the framing of the instructions and in the monetary incentives attached to them. For each
correctly solved hard anagram subjects earn DKK 5.00. For each solved easy anagram subjects
earn DKK 0.50. If subjects decide to switch to easy anagrams at the beginning of a new round,
they have to bear a cost of DKK 3.00. The total cost of switching to easy anagrams for one round
hence consists of the explicit switching cost and the implicit cost of reduced earning opportunities.
Each anagram is presented for up to 90 seconds. If a subject enters a correct solution, a new
anagram is displayed immediately. If a subject does not manage to solve an anagram within the
given time frame, a new anagram is generated free of cost. When working on hard anagrams,
subjects are, moreover, given the opportunity to “skip” individual anagrams. Then they do not
have to wait until the end of the 90 seconds, but a new anagram is generated immediately. Just like
switching to easy anagrams, also each skip comes at a cost of DKK 3.00. In the following analysis,
we consider switching to easy anagrams and excessive skipping of hard anagrams as manifestations
of non-perseverance.
Table 1 summarizes the monetary incentives. We chose this incentive structure to make switch-
ing to easy anagrams clearly monetarily unattractive. Subjects should be able to see without any
3An example for a hard anagram is the word “teachers” that can for instance be rearranged to “hectares”.
4The median “challenge” assessment of participants from the Baseline Treatment was 4 out of 5 points. Moreover,
there are neither significant gender difference in the number of easy anagrams solved in the practice period (Mann-
Whitney ranksum test result: p = 0.84), nor in the number of hard anagrams solved per hard rounds in the first
(p = 0.68) or second part of the experiment (p = 0.33) in the Baseline Treatment.
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Table 1: Monetary incentives in DKK
Action Payoff
Solving a hard anagram 5.00
Solving an easy anagram 0.50
Skipping a hard anagram −3.00
Switching to easy anagrams −3.00
DKK 1.00 corresponds to approximately EUR 0.13 or
US-Dollar 0.18.
formal calculation that even for less able individuals switching to easy anagrams is not a monetarily
optimal decision. Their choice can hence only be rationalized by a strong desire to avoid working
hard.5
The main part of the experiment is divided into two identical parts of 30 minutes each. Part 1
mainly serves us to measure subjects’ tactics on the task. It is defined as the subjects’ average
earnings in rounds in which they work on hard anagrams and reflects their ability to find their
payoff maximizing mixture of solving and skipping hard anagrams: Some subjects might obtain
a given payoff by skipping and solving many anagrams, while others generate the same payoff by
skipping and solving fewer anagrams. Part 2 varies across treatments and is hence the working
period of interest in our data analysis.
Both parts are partitioned into ten rounds of three minutes. In the first round of each part
subjects have to work on hard anagrams. We chose this set-up in order to stress the default
character of working on hard anagrams and to make sure that the subjects get to know the level
of difficulty of hard anagrams. At the beginning of each of the following nine rounds subjects can
choose to “stay with the hard anagrams” or to “switch to the easy anagrams” for the coming three
minutes.6 We hence allow subjects to go back to solving hard anagrams after having switched to
easy anagrams in the previous round (and vice versa).
In both part 1 and part 2, an information box on the computer screen continuously informs
subjects about how many hard anagrams they have already skipped since the beginning of the
current part and how many hard anagrams they have skipped in the current round. In rounds in
which subjects work on easy anagrams, no such information is displayed.
At the end of part 1 subjects receive feedback about their productivity on hard anagrams
and payoffs in that part. Furthermore, we ask them without previous announcement to make an
incentivized guess which performance quintile they belong to.7 In particular, we ask them to make
this guess based on their number of correctly solved hard anagrams. We reward the correct answer
with DKK 20.00. After subjects enter their guess they are informed about their actual performance
5Indeed, for only 2 out of our 152 subjects from the Baseline and Random Matching Treatment we find that their
lowest round earnings on easy anagrams in part 1 lay above their highest round earnings on hard anagrams (-3.00
vs. -2.50 and -1.00 vs. 0).
6See https://www.dropbox.com/s/qq838eaioo4yc3w/InstructionsAndScreenshots.pdf?dl=0 for a screen shot of
this decision stage and examples of other screens that were displayed during the experimental sessions.
7In one of our sessions only 6 subjects participated. Therefore we asked them to guess which performance tertile
they belonged to instead.
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quintile and part 2 starts.
Treatments: As mentioned above, the treatments are implemented in part 2 of the experimental
sessions. In the Baseline Treatment, the instructions presented in the beginning of part 2 simply
ask the subjects to continue working on the anagram task, as they did before in part 1.8 Subjects
in the Random Matching Treatment are presented a new set of instructions on their computer
screens. These inform them that half of the subjects in their session will be randomly assigned the
role of an Observer (in order to prevent framing effects called “Person A”) and the other half will
assume the role of a Peer (called “Person B”). Always one Observer and one Peer are randomly
matched for part 2. Both are presented with the same anagrams in the same order.
Observers learn their Peer’s performance quintile from part 1. Moreover and more importantly,
Observers are informed about their Peer’s skipping and switching behavior during part 2: When
Observers work on hard anagrams their computer screens display the total number of hard anagrams
the matched Peer has skipped since the beginning of that part and whether the Peer is working on
hard or easy anagrams in the current round. This information is updated at the beginning of each
round, that is, every three minutes. To prevent the emergence of so called “rat races” we do not
provide them with further information on the number of correctly solved hard or easy anagrams.
Peers receive no information about their Observer’s performance, but are informed about the type
of information that the Observer receives about them.
Questionnaire: After having finished working on the real-effort task we ask the subjects to fill
out a short questionnaire that comprises two parts. In the task-specific part we ask them how
they perceived working on the task. In the survey part we elicit a number of non-cognitive skills
and personality traits through non-incenitivized survey questions. In particular, we administer the
Short-Grit-Scale (Duckworth & Quinn 2009) which comprises eight items that are ranked on a 5
point scale and measure the tendency to sustain effort and maintaining interests over a long period
of time. The full list of items is presented in Appendix A.
A valid concern when running questionnaires at the end of an experiment is that the behavior
during and the outcome of the experiment might influence the answers given in the questionnaire.
To address this point, we randomize the order of the experiment and the survey part of the ques-
tionnaire in the Baseline Treatment at the session level. The task-related questions are always asked
at the end of the experiment. As discussed in Gerhards & Gravert (2015), the sequence of real
effort task and survey questions neither significantly affects the answers given in the questionnaire,
nor the performance on the task.
Procedures: We ran 16 experimental sessions in spring and summer 2014 at the Cognition and
Behavior (Cobe) Lab at Aarhus University. Subjects were recruited via the laboratory’s online
recruiting website from a subject pool of mostly undergraduate students from all faculties. In total
8Note that the Baseline Treatment presented in this paper corresponds to the data set that was use to analyze
further aspects in the companion paper Gerhards & Gravert (2015).
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152 subjects participated, out of which 69 (45 percent) were female. We observe 62 subjects in the
Baseline Treatment and 90 subjects in the Random Matching Treatment (45 Observers, 45 Peers).
Most of the subjects in our sample are Danish undergraduates. The participants had on average 9
years of English at school.
At the beginning of each session consent forms and detailed instructions about the experimental
task were distributed to the subjects.9 The subjects had 10 minutes to read the instructions.
Afterwards the experimenter asked if there were any questions or if anyone needed more time to
read. When all subjects denied, the experiment (programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007)) started
and all further instructions were provided on the computer screens. At the end of each session
either part 1 or part 2 was randomly selected for payments. Average earnings for the 90 minutes
sessions amounted to DKK 120.00, including the reward for a correct guess about the subject’s
own performance rank and a DKK 40.00 show-up fee. The payments were directly transferred to
the subjects’ bank accounts.
3.2 Results
In the following statistical analysis we will consider the four main outcome variables from part 2:
subjects’ round earnings from working on hard or easy anagrams, their number of solved hard
anagrams per round in which they worked on hard, their number of skipped hard anagrams and
their tendency to switch to easy anagrams. One can well consider the first variable a consolidated
measure of the three latter ones: The number of solved hard anagrams increases subjects’ earnings,
while skipping and switching reduces them.
Figure 1 gives a first overview of how the means of our outcome variables evolve over the
ten rounds in the Baseline and Random Matching Treatments. In general, the graphs paint a
rather positive picture of peer effects: The upper left graph suggests that Peers and Observers
in the Random Matching Treatment realize higher mean earnings than their counterparts from
the Baseline Treatment who work in isolation. This seems to result from the fact that Random
Matching subjects, on the one hand, solve more hard anagrams (see the upper right graph) and, on
the other hand, display less avoidance behavior (see the two lower graphs). In particular Observers
skip and Peers switch on average less often than subjects from the Baseline Treatment.
In the following regression analysis we are able to control for subject-specific abilities and
tactics and go into more depth with regards to the effects of being in a peer situation. We begin
by comparing Observers’ and Peers’ behavior to that of subjects from the Baseline Treatment.
Subsequently, we move on to study potential heterogeneous treatment effects. Lastly, we will
consider the question of how Observers are affected by specific attributes of their matched Peers.
9All instructions and screenshots of the experimental program can be downloaded from
https://www.dropbox.com/s/qq838eaioo4yc3w/InstructionsAndScreenshots.pdf?dl=0
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Figure 1: Outcome variables of interest across treatments
3.2.1 Observers react to their Peers, but Peers don’t seem to care.
Using the pooled OLS models (1) to (3) and the pooled Probit Model (4) in Table 2, we test for
general treatment effects and in particular role effects. We regress our four outcome variables on
role dummies that take the value 1 for subjects in the Observer and Peer role, respectively. That
is, we treat the subjects from the Baseline Treatment as reference group. Moreover, in all four
specifications we control for subjects’ tactics and task ability.
We define tactics as the average round earnings that subjects realize when working on hard
anagrams in part 1. These earnings depend on the number of correctly solved and skipped ana-
grams per round worked on hard. They indicate the subjects’ capability to find their individual
payoff-optimal mix of skipping and solving anagrams, which may well vary across subjects. Some
subjects might skip individual hard anagrams that they cannot solve in reasonable time, deliber-
ately accepting the costs of DKK 3.00, in order to try their luck on the next word that might yield
them a payoff of DKK 5.00. Other subjects might refrain from skipping entirely in order not to
reduce their earnings. Our measure allows us to control for these individual tactics in a unified
way.
Ability is defined as the number of solved easy anagrams in the unincentivized practice period.
Ideally, we would have preferred to define ability analogously to the tactics measure, that is, as the
average number of correctly solved anagrams when working on hard anagrams in part 1. However,
this measure is by definition correlated with our tactics variable (Spearman’s ρ = .87, p < .01)
and would have lead to severe multicollinearity problems in our regressions. Therefore, we rely on
performance in the practice period as our measure for ability. It is positively correlated with the
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Table 2: Observers and Peers compared to Baseline Treatment subjects
Hard anagrams...
Earnings ... solved ... skipped Switch to easy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observer -0.039 -0.236 -0.393∗∗∗ 0.067
(0.829) (0.213) (0.143) (0.234)
Peer -0.267 -0.055 -0.094 -0.009
(0.908) (0.225) (0.163) (0.236)
Constant 7.380∗∗∗ 1.895∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ -1.064∗∗∗
(0.731) (0.169) (0.133) (0.177)
Tactics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ability Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.406 0.476 0.158
Pseudo R2 0.128
Independent observa-
tions
152 152 152 152
Observations 1520 1232 1232 1368
Regression 1: pooled OLS, dependent variable: Earnings; Regression 2: pooled OLS, dependent
variable: Number of solved hard anagrams (given worked on hard); Regression 3: pooled OLS, de-
pendent variable: Number of of skipped anagrams in hard; Regression 4: pooled Probit, dependent
variable: Decision to switch to easy anagrams. Note that all continuous independent variables are
standardized. Robust standard errors are clustered at the subject level and given in parentheses: *
p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. All regressions include round dummies.
average number of correctly solved hard anagrams (ρ = .50, p < .01) and comparably less strongly
correlated with our tactics variable (ρ = .43, p < .01).
As becomes evident from Table 2, most of the role differences in Figure 1 are not statistically
significant once one includes the necessary controls for subjects’ tactics and ability. Subjects earn-
ings, their number of solved hard anagrams and their propensity to switch to easy anagrams do
not differ across roles and hence across treatments. The coefficient of the Peer dummy is in neither
of the regressions significant. We do, however, find that Observers display less avoidance behavior
by skipping significantly fewer hard anagrams than subjects from the Baseline Treatment. We
summarize our findings as follows:
Result 1 Being able to observe another subject significantly increases the Observers’ perseverance
when working on hard anagrams. In contrast, being aware of the fact that another subject observes
one’s actions does not significantly affect Peers’ performance.
This finding is in line with our model for positive peer effects from section 2. It is, however,
in contrast to both Mas & Moretti (2009) who find stronger effects for Peers than for Observers,
and to van Veldhuizen et al. (2015) who find that there is no difference in the behavior of Peers
and Observers. A potential explanation lies in the fact that Observers and Peers in our study are
not dependent on each other – neither in their workload, nor in their payoff. It thus seems highly
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unlikely that Peers work hard out of guilt or fear of upsetting their team, which might be a driving
factor in the other two experiments.
Another noteworthy aspect is the fact that we find significant overall peer effects in skipping,
but not in switching. We suspect that the high explicit and implicit costs of switching to easy
anagrams reduce subjects’ tendency to switch in general, leaving less room for peers to have an
effect. Nonetheless, we continue to consider peer effects in both avoidance behaviors – skipping
and switching – in the following steps of our analysis, since the overall null effects might conceal
noteworthy heterogeneous treatment effects.
3.2.2 Successful subjects perform even better in a peer situation
The question that arises from Result 1 is whether the average peer effect depends on specific
attributes of the Observers. In particular, is the positive effect on perseverance driven by high
skilled Observers who get more motivated by being in a peer situation – or rather by low skilled
individuals who imitate their Peers’ tactics? To answer this question we will consider interaction
effects between individuals’ task ability and their role as well as between their tactics on hard
anagrams and their role.
Moreover, we will tackle the question of whether subjects can learn from each other to behave
more perseverant conditional on their grit level that we elicit in the final questionnaire using
Duckworth & Quinn’s (2009) scale. This issue is of particular interest since Gerhards & Gravert
(2015) find that self-reported grit is significantly correlated with a lower tendency to skip hard
anagrams if subjects work in isolation. It is an open question whether this similarly holds in
situations in which peers are present.
The regressions reported in Table 3 build on the regressions reported in Table 2. Our dependent
variables are again earnings (Model (1)), the number of hard anagrams solved (Model (2)), the
number of skipped hard anagrams (Model (3)) and the decision to switch to easy anagrams (Model
(4)). We regress these outcome measures on role dummies for Observers and Peers (that is, subjects
from the Baseline Treatment are again treated as the reference group to both roles), our measures
of tactics and task ability and subjects’ self-reported grit. Moreover, we include interaction terms
of these personal attributes and the role dummies. All continuous variables are standardized in
order to facilitate the interpretation of the main and interaction effects.
When it comes to earnings, the positive and significant tactics main effect in Model (1) reveals
that a successful tactic in part 1 increases Baseline subjects’ earnings in part 2 of the experiment.
Interestingly, this positive tactics effect is even stronger for Observers, as indicated by the corre-
sponding positive and highly significant interaction term. Similarly, Observers benefit comparably
more from their general task ability than Baseline subjects. Self-reported grit influences neither
Baseline subjects’, nor Observers’ earnings significantly.
The findings on performance on hard anagrams from Model (2) largely replicate our result from
Model (1). Successful tactics on hard anagrams positively affect the Baseline subjects’ amount
of correctly solved anagrams. Moreover, this effect is even stronger for Observers and Peers. We
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Table 3: Heterogeneous treatment effects
Hard anagrams...
Earnings ... solved ... skipped Switch to easy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observer 0.370 -0.253 -0.353∗∗∗ 0.248
(0.760) (0.190) (0.128) (0.307)
Peer 0.494 -0.003 -0.161 0.210
(0.763) (0.195) (0.153) (0.304)
Tactics 4.695∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗ -1.398∗∗∗
(0.707) (0.208) (0.147) (0.409)
Observer × Tactics 3.617∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ -0.233 0.722
(1.189) (0.269) (0.171) (0.487)
Peer × Tactics 1.638 0.697∗∗ 0.186 0.875∗
(1.017) (0.301) (0.240) (0.512)
Ability -0.265 0.166 -0.017 0.985∗∗∗
(0.667) (0.188) (0.130) (0.210)
Observer × Ability 2.792∗ 0.413 0.173 -1.021∗∗∗
(1.466) (0.343) (0.182) (0.293)
Peer × Ability 0.249 0.000 0.217 -0.592∗
(0.930) (0.249) (0.205) (0.315)
Self-reported grit 0.178 -0.215 -0.370∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.492) (0.155) (0.134) (0.189)
Observer × Self-reported grit -0.043 0.061 0.348∗∗ -0.077
(0.765) (0.204) (0.148) (0.254)
Peer × Self-reported grit -0.905 0.161 0.488∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.672) (0.186) (0.161) (0.244)
Constant 6.833∗∗∗ 1.822∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ -1.282∗∗∗
(0.658) (0.145) (0.126) (0.266)
R2 0.445 0.511 0.252
Pseudo R2 0.166
Independent observations 152 152 152 152
Observations 1520 1232 1232 1368
Regression 1: pooled OLS, dependent variable: Earnings; Regression 2: pooled OLS, dependent variable: Number
of solved hard anagrams (given worked on hard); Regression 3: pooled OLS, dependent variable: Number of of
skipped anagrams in hard; Regression 4: pooled Probit, dependent variable: Decision to switch to easy anagrams.
Note that all continuous independent variables are standardized. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
subject level and given in parentheses: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. All regressions include round dummies.
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summarize our findings below:
Result 2 Being able to observe a Peer performing the same task reinforces the generally positive
effects of successful tactics (and task ability) on earnings through an increase in the number of
correctly solved hard anagrams.
This result suggests that in our experiment in particular high performers benefit from being in
a peer situation. Model (3) yields further interesting results. First, it reproduces our finding from
Table 2: Being in the Observer role generally reduces subjects’ amount of skipping. The respective
“Observer” main effect is highly significant and the size of the coefficient remains largely unaffected
by the inclusion of further control variables (compare the corresponding coefficient in Model (3)
of Table 2). Moreover, the positive and significant “Tactics” main effect suggests that a certain
amount of skipping can indeed be explained by money-maximizing, strategical consideration. And
lastly, we find that Baseline subjects skip significantly less the more gritty they are. Remarkably
however, this effect is significantly less pronounced for Observers and Peers. Apparently, these
subjects from the Random Matching treatment skip fewer hard anagrams irrespective of their
initial level of grit. This indicates that own grit and being in a peer situation can act as substitutes
when it comes to reducing avoidance behavior.
Model (4) provides similar insights in the sense that also the Random Matching subjects’
inclination to switch depends less on their personal characteristics than the Baseline subjects’:
In particular, we find that the Baseline subjects’ tendency to switch to easy anagrams depends
negatively on their tactics on hard anagrams and positively on their task ability (remember, we
defined the ability variable as performance on easy anagrams). Observers’ – and to a lesser extent
also Peers’ – switching decisions, on the other hand, depend significantly less on their ability. Taken
together, we summarize our findings from Model (3) and (4) as follows:
Result 3 Subjects’ abilities and attributes play less of a role in peer situations in which they can
observe others or are aware of the fact that their performance is reported to a peer.
Ultimately, our findings from Model (3) suggest that being in a peer situation can work as a
substitute for own grit. A potential reason for this could be that Observers become more perseverant
by imitating the behavior of their Peer. An alternative explanation could be that the mere existence
of the Peer leads Observers to become more perseverant on the task. In the following we will
disentangle these two effects – that is the information effect resulting from observing the Peer’s
actual behavior and the social facilitation effect caused by the mere presence of the Peer.
3.2.3 Similar able Peers affect Observers’ performance most
In the regressions presented in Table 4 we focus on potential determinants of Observers’ avoidance
behavior in the Random Matching Treatment.10 As described in section 3.1 above, in the beginning
10Note that we can use only 42 out of our 45 Observers in the regressions in Table 4 since three Observers switched
to easy anagrams in every single round in which this was possible. They hence never received information about their
Peers’ avoidance behavior.
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of part 2 we inform the Observers about their own and their Peers’ performance quintile from
part 1. Furthermore, in rounds in which Observers work on hard anagrams, the computer screen
continuously informs them about their Peer’s avoidance behavior in part 2. In particular, Observers
are informed whether their Peer works on hard or easy anagrams in the present round and how
many hard anagrams the Peer has skipped until the previous round.11 In the pooled OLS Model
(1) we estimate the effect of the Peer’s skipping information on the Observers’ amount of skipping.
In the pooled Probit Model (2) we study how the Peer’s switching decision in the last round affects
the Observers’ decision to switch to easy anagrams in the present round. Since these information
effects might well depend on the similarity (or dissimilarity) of the Observer and Peer, we add a
further dummy variable that takes the value one if the Peer was from a higher performance quintile
(i.e. solved more hard anagrams correctly in part 1) than the Observer. We additionally interact
this “Peer from higher quintile” dummy with our information variables.
Table 4: Determinants of Observers’ avoidance behavior
(1) (2)
Skips in hard Switch to easy
Peer from higher quintile -0.071 0.770∗
(0.176) (0.464)
Peer’s skips until present round -0.072
(0.043)
Peer’s skips × Peer from higher quintile 0.149
(0.099)
Peer switched in previous round 1.122∗∗
(0.514)
Peer switched × Peer from higher quintile -1.842∗∗∗
(0.652)
Constant 0.270∗ -2.019∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.595)
Tactics Yes Yes
Ability Yes Yes
R2 0.186
Pseudo R2 0.151
Independent observations 42 42
Observations 317 280
Regression 1: pooled OLS, dependent variable: Number of of skipped anagrams in hard; Regression 2: pooled
Probit, dependent variable: Decision to switch to easy anagrams. Note that all continuous independent variables
are standardized. Robust standard errors are clustered at the subject level and given in parentheses: * p<0.10
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. All regressions include dummy variables for sub-periods.
Model (1) reveals that neither the main effect of Peer’s skipping in the previous rounds, nor the
main effect of Peer’s relative ability is significant. Neither of the two variables is able to significantly
explain the Observer’s tendency to skip hard anagrams. This finding, together with the significantly
11The instructions emphasized that we classify the decision to switch to easy anagrams like a skip of a hard
anagram. The latter figure therefore also includes the number of switches.
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negative “Observer” main effect from Model (3) in Table 3, suggests that Observers reduce their
amount of skipping compared to Baseline subjects due to a general social facilitation effect (Zajonc
1965). Apparently, any kind of information about the Peer leads the Observer to skip significantly
less often. The actual behavior of the Peer plays less of a role. The insignificant interaction term
“Peer’s skips × Peer from higher quintile” moreover suggests that this holds irrespective of the
Peer’s relative ability.
However, when we consider the Observers’ tendency to switch to easy anagrams, that is, the
more fundamental form of avoidance behavior, Model (2) implies that the Peer’s behavior actually
does influence the Observer’s behavior. First, the positive “Peer switched in previous round” main
effect indicates that if a similar or less able Peer switched (did not switch) in the previous round,
this significantly positively affects the Observer’s decision (not) to switch. Second, as indicated
by the negative coefficient of the interaction term “Peer switched × Peer from higher quintile”,
the Peer’s switching decision is significantly less correlated with the Observers’ decision if the Peer
is from a higher performance quintile. Lastly, and in a similar vein, the positive and significant
main effect of “Peer from higher quintile” suggests that observing a better Peer staying with hard
anagrams leads the Observer to switch to easy more often. We summarize our findings from Table 4
as follows:
Result 4 The Observers’ tendency to skip is neither significantly affected by their matched Peers’
relative task ability, nor by their actual skipping behavior. Observers do, however, imitate their
Peer’s switching behavior if they are matched to a similar or less able Peer. If the Peer is out
of reach ability-wise, his presence and his actual behavior have less of an effect on the Observer’s
switching decisions.
4 Self-selection into the Observer and Peer Roles
The findings from our treatments raised two further research questions. First, since the Peer’s
impact on their Observer differs depending on their relative abilities, we became interested in the
question of what kind of Peer Observers would like to observe if they had a choice. If subjects
were able to correctly anticipate our findings from Result 4, we would expect them to choose a
Peer of similar or slightly worse ability. Also according to the social comparison model by Falk &
Knell (2004), which is based on the social comparison theory by Festinger (1954), Observers should
on average choose Peers that are similar to them. This inference is deduced from balancing two
competing motivations: On the one hand, an upwards comparison can inspire individuals to work
harder (self-improvement). On the other hand, a downwards comparison can make them feel better
about themselves (self-enhancement). Thus, as one’s own ability rises, the reference level for social
comparison rises as well in order to stay close to one’s own level. Battaglini et al. (2005) extend the
ideas of Falk & Knell (2004) and consider social comparison in situations that require perseverance
in particular. They predict that the ideal peer is someone who has a slightly worse self-control
problem than oneself, because this makes the peer’s successes more encouraging and his failures
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less discouraging. Based on these theoretical models and our previous findings we conjecture that
Observers in our experiment choose on average Peers who are equally or slightly less able than
themselves.
Second, we investigate more generally which factors and personal characteristics are able to
explain a desire to voluntarily self-select into the Observer and Peer role. The questionnaire data
from the Random Matching Treatment provide a first hint. Since we exogenously and randomly
assigned Observers and Peers to their roles in this treatment, this data allows us to cleanly identify
potential differences in task perception depending on role. In particular, we asked all subjects
from the Random Matching Treatment (1) how much they enjoyed working on the task, (2) how
challenging, (3) how exhausting they perceived the task and, (4) how much effort they provided
during the task. Answers were given on 5-point scales. At the aggregate, ranksum tests do not
reveal significant differences between the answers provided by Observers and Peers (p = .43, p = .25,
p = .47 and p = .25, respectively). But the picture changes if we restrict the group of Observers to
those 22 subjects who were matched to a Peer from a higher performance quintile. These Observers
report to having enjoyed the task significantly less (p = .07) and having perceived the task as a
greater challenge (p = .03) than the 45 Peers. From this finding one could conjecture that subjects
in the Chosen Matching Treatment will exhibit a tendency to avoid the Observer role – in particular
if they expect to observe a Peer from a better performance quintile, for instance, due to their own
rather low ability. However, one could also argue that subjects dislike the position in which they
are observed by others and hence rather avoid the Peer role. The fact that only avoidance behavior
and not positively connoted productivity is reported to the Observer might reinforce this effect.
It is hence an empirical question which of the two effects prevails, i.e. which role is preferred on
average.
In order to tackle the questions of peer selection and role choice, we designed a third treatment,
the Chosen Matching Treatment, that we will describe in the following.
4.1 Experimental Design: Chosen Matching Treatment
In the summer and fall of 2014 we invited 90 additional subjects to the lab using the same recruiting
procedure as the Baseline and Random Matching Treatment. During the experimental sessions the
only difference to the Random Matching Treatment is the intervention that we introduce between
part 1 and part 2: After guessing and being informed about their performance quintile in part 1
all subjects have to make two choices for part 2. First, we ask them to indicate whether they want
to assume the role of an Observer or that of a Peer (labeled Person A and Person B, similar to
the Random Matching Treatment). We inform subjects that the computer allocates the desired
roles under the premise that within each performance quintile always one of the subjects assumes
either role. This procedure is strategy-proof, as the subjects’ best strategy is still to state their
preferences truthfully, and yet it gives us the flexibility to allocate the experimental roles in an
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efficient way.12
Subsequently, we ask the subjects to state from which performance quintile they want to observe
a Peer in case they are assigned the role of an Observer. Using these procedures it is possible that
more than one Observer is matched to one Peer. For all participants who actually assume the role
of a Peer we elicit their belief on somebody choosing to observe them or not. However, at this stage
the Peers are not informed whether and how many subjects observe them. Only after they finish
working on the anagram task in the end of part 2 they receive information on whether their guesses
about actually being observed were correct and whether they will earn additional DKK 20.00 for
their correct guess.
4.2 Results: Chosen Matching Treatment
In the following, we first consider subjects’ peer choices. That is, in the words of Falk & Knell (2004)
we focus on the question of whether on average the self-enhancing (downward) or the self-improving
(upward) comparison motivation determines subjects’ peer choices.
Figure 2: Choice of Peer quintile
Figure 2 shows for each of the subjects’ performance quintile separately, their preferred Peer’s
performance quintile. As evident, in all five quintiles, at least fifty percent of the subjects prefer to
be informed about the avoidance behavior of a Peer from their own or a (slightly) better performance
12In fact, 29 out of 90 subjects in that treatment were allocated their roles randomly: 6 out of 28 subjects who
wanted to be an Observer had to assume the Peer role, 23 out of 62 subjects who stated a preference for the Peer
role had to take on the role of an Observer. The remaining 61 subjects could assume the roles they initially stated
as their preferred choice.
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quintile. This suggests that, on average, the self-improvement comparison motivation seems to
prevail in our experiment.
However, there is also a non-negligible fraction of subjects from the five quintiles that wishes
to observe the avoidance behavior of a (slightly) worse peer, which is in line with Battaglini et al.’s
(2005) prediction.
Next we consider subjects’ role choices. Interestingly, we find that 62 out of the 90 subjects
want to assume the Peer role, that is, they want to be the ones being observed. Using a regression
analysis we aim at eliciting the determinants of this choice. In individual Probit models we regress
the subjects’ decision to become a Peer (= 1, vs. an Observer = 0) on their average performance on
hard anagrams in part 1, their amount of skipping and switching in part 1, overconfidence (regarding
their performance quintile in part 1) as well as on their self-reported levels of narcissism, grit,
altruism and gender that we elicit in the questionnaire. It turns out that only two of these variables
have significant effects on the desire to assume the Peer role. Subjects’ average performance on
hard anagrams is positively correlated with their wish to be observed, while subjects’ inclination to
switch to easy anagrams is negatively correlated with it. The corresponding regression Table B.1
is reported in Appendix B.
Still puzzled by the finding that about two thirds of the subjects wanted to take on the Peer role,
we further consulted their statements in the final questionnaire where we asked them to explain
the reasons why they selected a specific role. Interestingly, 41 out of the 62 would-be Peers stated
having chosen that role in order to avoid any information that might distract them from their work.
One of those subjects, for instance, stated: “I did not want to observe anybody else, as I thought
it would be annoying while working.”. These subjects were hence consciously self-selecting out of
a situation in which they would receive information about a peer. Since we did not provide them
with a neutral “No peer option”, they could only self-select into the Peer role in our experiment.
Only three of the remaining 21 subjects who wanted to assume the Peer role stated that they
wanted to do so in order to provide a good example for their Observer such that he or she could learn
from observation. One of them for instance wrote that she, “felt very confident in the experiment,
so [she] figured that someone else, might benefit from seeing, what/how [she] was doing.”
Taken together, our results from the Chosen Matching Treatment indicate that individuals
would rather like to avoid receiving information about a peer’s performance in a cognitively de-
manding task such as ours. However, when being forced into an Observer position, they seem to
be guided by the motive of self-improvement, suggesting that they are aware of the potentially
motivating peer effects that we found in the Random Matching Treatment.
5 Conclusion
Although the literature on peer effects has been growing over the last couple of years, the precise
mechanisms how peer effects arise are still a black box. In this paper we uncovered some new
puzzle pieces that help us to better understand how individuals are affected by peers. In particular,
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instead of simply measuring how peers influence produced output, we study how the presence of
a peer affects subjects’ behavior in a rather qualitative dimension, that is, how peers affect their
co-workers’ perseverance.
We measure perseverance in a word play task in which subjects can skip anagrams or switch
to easier anagrams in order to avoid working on the default task solving hard anagrams. After
working independently in part 1 of the experiment, subjects in our Random Matching Treatment
are randomly assigned the role of an Observer or a Peer and randomly matched to each other.
We find that Observers’ skipping behavior decreases significantly when they receive information
about a Peer. This effect is independent of the Peer’s actual behavior, which suggests a general
social facilitation effect (Zajonc 1965). However, when only considering the switching behavior of
Observers who are matched to a similarly or less able Peer, we find that these Observers react to
the actual behavior of their Peer. In particular, Observers seem to act according to the motto “if
he can do it, so can I”: when their Peer stayed with hard anagrams in the previous round, the
Observer has a higher propensity to stay with hard, too. If, conversely, the Peer is out of reach
ability-wise, his presence and his actual behavior have less of an effect on the Observer’s switching
behavior. For Peers, knowing to be observed does not affect their behavior. On average, they do
not behave significantly different than subjects from our Baseline Treatment who work in isolation.
The fact that all Observers, independent of their ability, increase their perseverance in the
presence of a Peer has policy implications for diverse situations in which peer effects can be expected,
including, but not limited to sport, social, work and educational contexts. The fact that the social
facilitation effect alone increases a group’s average perseverance allows for the formation of teams
with varying ability and grit levels. In the organizational context superiors are well advised to
arrange working conditions that permit workers to observe each other regardless of their individual
tasks, in order to profit from perseverance-increasing peer effects. Examples being open plan offices
or open factory work spaces. In a similar vein, our findings suggest that (university) students could
benefit from studying in the library or study rooms instead of working individually at home. In the
domain of sports, athletes might benefit from training with other athletes – even if they compete in
a different sport – in order to reap motivational effects by observing peer athletes staying persistent
in their training.
However, although our findings from the Random Matching Treatment suggest that peers in-
crease their co-workers’ perseverance, the results from our third treatment, the Chosen Matching
Treatment, suggest that a significant part of the work-force might prefer to avoid the peer situa-
tion entirely. When given the choice between the Observer and Peer role, the majority of subjects
prefers the Peer role. Subjects’ survey responses suggest that they use this as a means to avoid
being distracted by information about another subject’s actions, even at the expense that their
own avoidance behavior is observed by others. This finding warrants further study, as it shines
new light on how to interpret peer effects. Individuals might prefer and even deliberately choose to
work alongside a peer in a tedious task such as Falk & Ichino’s (2006) folding letters into envelopes
task. However, if they are confronted with a mentally more challenging task that requires a high
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level of concentration, the findings from the present study indicate that they might prefer to work
in isolation in order to not get distracted by peer information.
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A Questionnaire
Grit Scale: Scored from (1) (“Not at all like me”) to (5) (“Very much like me”). Items 1, 3, 5
and 6 are reversely coded.
1. New ideas and projects sometimes distract me from previous ones.
2. Setbacks don’t discourage me.
3. I have been obsessed with a certain idea or project for a short time but later lost interest.
4. I am a hard worker.
5. I often set a goal but later choose to pursue a different one.
6. I have difficulty maintaining my focus on projects that take more than a few months to
complete.
7. I finish whatever I begin.
8. I am diligent.
B Additional tables
Table B.1: Chosen Matching Treatment: Determinants of Peer role choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Solved hard anagrams 0.183∗
in part 1 (0.100)
Skipped hard anagrams 0.019
in part 1 (0.037)
Switches to easy anagrams −0.108∗∗
in part 1 (0.053)
Self-reported narcissism 0.102
(0.528)
Self-reported grit −0.073
(0.234)
Self-reported altruistic inclination 0.016
(0.052)
Overconfident regarding performance −0.279
quintile in part 1 (0.294)
Female −0.111
(0.280)
Constant 0.114 0.446∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.445 0.724 0.379 0.587∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.164) (0.213) (0.283) (0.759) (0.407) (0.172) (0.186)
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.003 0.037 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Probit regressions with robust standard errors that are given in parentheses: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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